Arezki Daoud

From the Salafist Group of Preaching and Combat in Algeria, the Salafiya Jihadia in Morocco, the Islamic Combatant Group in Libya, to the Islamic Jihadist Group in Tunisia, one can see the beginning of the formation of a pan-Maghreb militancy organization network with possible devastating impact on local populations and governments. At the top of this network of bad characters and troublemakers is the Al-Qaeda’s spiritual guidance which leads these organizations into a struggle to destabilize the region and move beyond.

A number of international and domestic press reported that an Al-Qaeda Maghreb unit was responsible for the seven bombs that exploded in and around Algiers last week. While the link to Al-Qaeda may not be of significance to the Algerian population that has endured such a long struggle with brutal militant groups like the GIA and the GSPC, it is a significant event in that it will likely influence how the local Al-Qaeda “subsidiaries” will adopt new tactics and strategies learned from the Al-Qaeda experience. It is also significant in that an Al-Qaeda link would be what is needed to create ties among the decentralized organizations operating in the region and which have been so far uncoordinated and without formal links.

Beside their common ideological trait, the physical link that is said to exist between the GSPC and Al-Qaeda is not fully documented apart from revelations coming from Ayman Al-Zawahiri in a video-released speech. Observers in Algiers believe the GSPC has become a fully-controlled agent of Al-Qaeda. While no one expected the GSPC to completely disappear with its usual roadblocks and targeted attackes in remote areas, the use of car and truck bombs was the most recent surprising turn of events, further highlighting its capabilities to harm and also acknowledging the use of new tactics inherited from Al-Qaeda’s playbook.

With these latest developments, there is fear in Algiers that there is more to come. The ease in the way the terrorists planned and executed their plots, even in some of the most secured police zones took many by surprise. These events also show that Algeria’s security posture has somewhat eased and it now needs fresh momentum.

For the terrorist organization, these latest bombings are a message sent to the authorities that the Charter for Peace and Reconciliation proposed by president Bouteflika and endorsed by a popular referendum may not have been so efficient after all, even though we think it was. The charter was aimed at establishing peace through a forgiveness process. Such process would be an incentive for many insurgents to give up their illegal activities, hence weakening the terror organizations and make them less and less relevant. In November 2006, Interior Minister Yazid Zerhouni stated that the number of insurgents fell by between 750 and 800 since September 2005, a degradation that occurred through surrenders, killings and arrests. Seeking to be reassuring after a series of GSPC-organized bombings in the suburbs of Algiers that year, Zerhouni stated that such figure represented a massive loss to insurgent organizations. For him, the 2006 attacks should not come as a surprise. They were the result of aggressive hard-core terrorists who will never give up their activities no matter what and will have to be handled in a manner that the outcome would be their destruction. But Zerhouni also speculated that the attacks and the methods used were signs of real weakness.

While there has been considerable erosion in the ranks of terrorist groups, their leaders are fully aware that acts such as car bombings and re-branding using the name Al-Qaeda could be two major factors that are guaranteed to attract the world’s media attention. And so they did. That alone could help regain some momentum and win new sympathizers. But also seeking to survive, the GSPC has been more than willing to align itself to Al-Qaeda, pledging allegiance to one of its leaders, Ayman Al-Zawahiri.

Established in 1998, the GSPC was an extremist splinter organization derived from the equally gruesome GIA. The split in the GIA was led by Hassan Hattab, with its primary goal to terrorize the Algerian population and topple the government. But as Algeria launched a multi-faceted anti-terror campaign, combining a political settlement through reconciliation and a sustained armed offensive, the GIA and the GSPC suffered massive losses. Taking over the leadership of the GSPC in 2004, Abdelmalek Droukdal, known as Moussaab Abdel Ouadoud (with two smaller organizations loyal to him) was practically the only one to turn down the offer of reconciliation and refused to give up his activities. With losses in manpower, Droukdal aligned his organization with Al-Qaeda, seeking to expand operations outside of Algeria, where the security services and the military have been relentlessly attacking their positions. A search of operations elsewhere was Droukdal goal. The GSPC is said to be operating with between 700 and 800 men, hidden mainly in the rugged Kabylie mountains in the north-central region of the country and in the south Sahara region, along the borders of Algeria with Mali and Niger, where they operate contraband operations as ways to smuggle weapons. While active in remote areas, these latest attacks in Algiers show that urban warfare is not a thing of the past and is something they have not forgotten.

So the GSPC, despite being wounded and loosing men, is not dead yet and seems to solidify, contradicting remarks made in Tunis by the Algerian minister of local collectivities, that “the end of the GSPC is near and that it represented no threat to Algeria, the Maghreb or France.” But did the minister underestimate the capabilities of the GSPC? In some recent past, observers believed that an allegiance to Al-Qaeda would be more detrimental to its future. Could the opposite be true? What is certain is that in its home territory of Algeria, the GSPC is going on the offensive to demonstrate that it is a force to reckon with, still capable of hitting targets where it wants, when it wants, and in gruesome ways.

The Algerian minister’s remarks in Tunisia came ironically at a time when Tunisia has been facing its own share of troubles. Early this year, a group of 27 men, all Tunisian nationals has been dismantled. Said to be linked and trained by the GSPC, the group included Lassaad Sassi, who has been active in Italy in the 1990s. Sassi is credited for creating a special unit in Tunisia

Recent events in Tunisia could indicate that terror organizations are expanding their operations. This is because Tunisia has long been sheltered from terrorist acts given the dense presence of police everywhere. It is not a surprise that the deadly face off that occurred in December and January between the police and the terrorist group came as a shock to the Tunisians. The complete communications blackout from the government signaled a sense of unease and embarrassment among the authorities, in events that led to the death of more than 30 people, including 12 police officers. It took the government eight days to acknowledge the incident involved a Salafist group.

The latest events began in late December 2006 when a so-called Salafist group was identified in Hammam-Lif, Tunisia. Their presence became suspicious after a baker reported to the police that large amounts of bread were purchased daily, forcing the security forces to set up surveillance operations, then roadblocks and car searches before encircling a mountain near Grombalia, 20 miles from Tunis.

With the heavy exchange of fire that ensued, it became quickly evident that police were not dealing with drug smugglers or other usual criminals but rather with a heavily armed gang of terrorists with political motives. The terrorist group under attack had only five individuals, including a Mauritanian national, apparently well trained in combat operations and armed with RPGs and Kalashnikovs. The group was headed by the notorious Lassaad Sassi, a former para-military police officer from Bir El-Bey, who apparently has experience in places like Afghanistan and Algeria. His aid, Rabia Pacha was also killed during the confrontation.

While calm has returned to the region, there is a sense of frustration and fear as sources in Tunisian believe that the killing of the five men may not be the end of the story. Some in Tunis say the group comprises of as many as 300 militants and already skirmishes have occurred in Ghadames and a large quantity of arms was found in Amilcar, near Tunis.

Of important note is that this new breed of terrorists that are targeting Tunisia has nothing to do with the older militants that have been so repressed in the past, including their leader Rachid Ghanouchi, currently living in London.

Morocco too has long been part of the regional theater of operations with connections between its members and sister organizations elsewhere in North Africa. A half a dozen cells were dismantled in 2006. As recently as mid-February this year, Moroccan police arrested seven individuals in the region of Meknes, accusing them of belonging to an illegal militant organization called Salafiya Jihadia. Four of them have since been released, while the three others were transferred to a special police unit for further investigation. The arresting enforcement agency alleges that the 24 to 26 years-old men were preparing to stage terrorist attacks in several sites, from military sites to universities and hotels. This kind of news is something Moroccans are increasingly used to and many have doubts about the validity about these arrests.

Yet, Morocco too is on Al-Qaeda’s radar and its affiliates there have been particularly active in the aftermath of the deadly attacks of May 2003. Events that put the Moroccans face to face with the Fundamentalists include on April 20, 2004 in Berrechid and the May 1st, 2004 events in Sid El Khadir, Casablanca, followed by a series of events in Mohammedia, Sale, Meknes, Fez, Essaouira, Youssoufia, and other areas, that resulted in severe and often questionable security crackdown. In November last year, the state-owned news agency MAP released a short wire announcing “the dismantling of a cell of 17-members affiliated to a radical organization with connections to other similar organizations active in Iraq. These Ira-based units are said to have links to Al-Qaeda.” Later, the identities of four of the 17 members were released, with the ring leader being Mohamed R’ha, a Belgian of Moroccan decent, with no experience on the Afghan field. R’ha has spent some time in Syria, a country that is used as a transit and clandestine infiltration point of activists entering Iraq. R’ha’s connections in Europe included Islamists activists of North Africa origin. R’ha is accused by the Moroccan intelligence services of conspiring with Khaled Azig to create a new terrorist organization to strike Moroccan targets. Azig was a theology student in Syria, who arrived in Morocco in June, after transiting via Turkey. The Moroccan authorities also accused two former Guantanamo Bay detainees for preparing to join the pair. The former Guantanamo inmates, Brahim Benchekroun and Mohamed Mazouz have mysteriously disappeared since November 11. Media sources have reported that few members of the Moroccan army were also contributing to the formation of the terror cell. The dismantling of this cell led to the dismantling of similar cells in Spain, Belgium, Holland, Denmark and the United Kingdom.

But this type of information, including how the Moroccan authorities operate, remains so limited that it raises even more questions about the validity of the reality on the ground. Some in Morocco say the government likes to dramatize events for political purposes. They say a great number of “security operations” are announced but lack of corroboration and details make these operations suspicious. Is it possible that the post-September 11 era created opportunities for those in the regimes in the region and around the world to exaggerate the security risk to push for their own political agendas? Recently, hundreds of the thousands of alleged militant Islamists were freed by Royal Grace in Morocco. But if they were so dangerous, why such forgiveness? Among them is Abdellatif Amrine, who was sentenced for a 30-year jail term and later pardoned by the monarchy. Why would such a “dangerous criminal”, who claims to have nothing to do with the May 16th, 2003 attacks, be released and allowed to move freely? Some argue that his release and that of other individuals were part of an unspoken agreement between the monarchy and the Salafist movement. But according to political observers in Morocco many pro-eradication figures in government are vehemently opposed to kind of deal with the Salafists, using the terrorist card as a pretest to wage an all-out war.

Arezki Daoud is the editor of North Africa Journal