Shehata M. Nasser

The dialogue between Saudi Arabia and Iran that recently started with the visit of Secretary of Iran’s Supreme National Security Council Ali Larijani to Riyadh, and the subsequent visit by Secretary-General of the Saudi National Security Council Prince Bandar bin Sultan to Tehran, raises the question on the reasons behind such deliberations and the regional implications that they entail. What raises this question is that Saudi–Iranian relations had recently entered to a tense period of open diplomatic hostility on various regional issues involving Iraq, the Gulf, Palestine, and Lebanon, wherein Saudi Arabia had raised Arab apprehensions over the spread of Iranian influence in the Arab region. It also sought an alliance with Egypt and Jordan to confront this influence, in addition to being part of the alliance of moderates that Washington has forged for confronting the hard-line alliance, of which Iran is a key member. In this context, many have speculated on the reasons for this sudden change in relations between Riyadh and Tehran and have tried to draw its implications. Some commentators have supported it as being the best mechanism for settling regional crises and disputes through a process of regional dialogue that is free of foreign interference, whereas others have warned of its long-term implications on the nature of relations and balance of power in the Gulf and the Middle East.

In general, it can be said that there were three reasons that caused the beginning of the dialogue between Saudi Arabia and Iran. Firstly, there was the danger of large-scale escalation of sectarian tensions between Sunnis and the Shiites, and the fear on part of Iranians and Saudis of the conflict enveloping the whole region that would be disastrous for all sides. It seems that the results of Iranian-Saudi dialogue with respect to this particular issue has started to show results; as Iran has stopped the publication of the Siasat-e Rooz newspaper after it published an article that Iran considered offended the sensibilities of the Sunnis. In addition, different sources indicate that Iran has requested from Saudi Arabia to prevent the issuance of a Fatwa by Saudi religious scholars that equate Shiites with infidels. For its part, Riyadh has requested Iran to seriously implement an earlier Fatwa by Iran’s Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei that forbids the cursing of the Companions (the Sahaba) of the Prophet (P.B.U.H).

The second reason for the talks relate to the dramatic developments on various fronts where Iranian and Saudi positions intersect in the region, and the possibility of their flare-up in a way that could be harmful to regional security and the interests of both countries. Prominent among these are the Lebanese and Iraqi issues, in which the level of aggravation has reached a stage that could lead to a civil war whose repercussions could be felt throughout the region. The Iran–Saudi differences over Lebanon and Iraq had reached a point where a decision had to be taken between entering into a bloody confrontation or pursuing the path of dialogue and revision. Both sides chose the path of dialogue due to the very high cost of any conflict.

The third reason for the talks relate to the danger of a military confrontation between Iran and the United States, in light of US military build-up in the Gulf and recent hints by the new US Secretary of Defense, Robert Gates, that the build-up is directed mainly at Iran. Moreover, there has been an escalation in US accusations against Iran over the latter’s involvement in acts of violence in Iraq and President Bush has allowed his forces to kill all Iranian elements that may threaten the security situation inside Iraqi territories. In light of these developments, Saudi Arabia fears the disastrous results of an American military action against Iran, both at the local level or at the regional level, and so it has pursued the path of calming its relations with Iran to avoid falling within the sphere of Iranian retaliation in the event of a military action by Washington. Riyadh also might have seen that the United States and some Arab powers were trying to exploit its anger toward Iran, and turning it into an excuse for settling scores with the latter. For this reason, it has decided to soften its position to avoid the situation from slipping further. As for Iran, the dialogue with Saudi Arabia offered it a window in the wall of a political siege erected by the United States, and a means to tear down the regional alliance of moderates that the US Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice had sought to oppose the hardliner’s alliance headed by Iran. It has also found in the dialogue a softening of the increasing Sunni rage against the Shiites and Iran, an anger that it sees as being raised for political motives and is linked to the possibility of a military strikes by the United States in the near future.

The failure of the United States in handling various crises in the region, even becoming part of the problem in Iraq, Palestine, and Lebanon, is another reason for the Iranian–Saudi exchanges. It has become clear to Riyadh that its warnings to Washington of the increasing Iranian influence in the region did not help the US bring about an affirmative and considered revision in its policies. What has happened is that Saudi Arabia finds itself between two possible scenarios—the first being the possible build-up toward a US-Iran confrontation, while the second pertains to US dialogue with Tehran, as sought by many parties in the US who consider it the best mechanism for settling differences with Iran. If the Bush administration is pursuing the path of escalation at the current stage, the dialogue process is still being proposed and is yet not a closed option. On the contrary, the escalation could be a preface to it and a means for applying more pressure and stringent conditions. In light of this situation, Saudi Arabia has selected its own course and opened communication channels with the Iranian side.

Whatever the reasons leading to the Iranian–Saudi dialogue, what is important are its implications for future relations on the region and the balance of power. The first inference from this dialogue reveals that the discussion on regional issues, like Lebanon and Iraq represent a clear Saudi admittance of Iran’s influential regional role. This even underlines Iran’s admittance of forcefully seeking to put on the trappings of such a role.

The second inference that can be drawn is that Saudi Arabia has started to control the pace of Arab response toward the present crises. It led a wave of Arab anger against the Iranian role in Iraq and Lebanon that was then picked up by other Arab countries, and it is now making a major change by opening a political dialogue with Tehran. The picture is getting clearer with respect the Saudi role whose circle has widened in the Arab arena, not only as regards Lebanon and Iraq but also on the Palestinian issue.

The third inference relates to the retreat of the Arab role on Arab crises that is not in favor of some superpower, as is usually the case, but in favor of a regional power that is Iran, which has started to control the course of events in Lebanon and Iraq and the Palestinian territories. The tendency of Saudi Arabia for dialogue with Iran reflects this clearly. Its dialogue with Iran reflects the failure of the tripartite Arab alliance among Egypt, Jordan, and Saudi Arabia in treating the Arab crises and liberating it from the influential and overpowering Iranian role.

When looking at its background, reasons, and implications, the Iranian-Saudi dialogue has raised an important question about the chances of success in calming the crises and conflicts in the region.

It is certain that this dialogue will contribute to calming the atmosphere of sectarian tensions in the region, but three factors undermine the role of such a dialogue in treating the explosive situation in Lebanon, Iraq, and Palestine. The first of these relates to Iranian use of these crises as political bargaining chips used against the United States and the Arabs. For that reason, it is unlikely not accept settlement of each crisis separately; as that will disarm its advantage one by one. By using all these cards together, it would be able to put pressure for reaching an international and regional deal on its nuclear program on the one hand, and its regional role on the other. This means that the Iranian-Saudi dialogue might contribute to calming down the Lebanese crises, but it may not be able to defuse it, as Iran seems adamant to keep its fuse in its hands.

The second factor relates to the American dimension of all these crises regarding the dialogue between Riyadh and Tehran, which means that without the participation of the United Sates or its approval, this dialogue will not lead to tangible or important breakthroughs. In light of the fact that the American administration refuses strongly the option of dialogue with Tehran, it would limit what Saudi Arabia and Iran could achieve through dialogue.

The third and last consideration is related to the distancing Syria from this dialogue, although it is an important and vital party that cannot be ignored in the crises of Lebanon, Iraq and Palestine. It is certain that Damascus will work on stopping any compromise that will not take its interests into consideration, especially that it has the influence to abort any agreement to such effect.

Especial arrangement with the Emirates Center for Strategic Studies and Research