Arezki Daoud

2007 will be an important year for Morocco’s political future and a test of how much progress democracy has made in spite of a potential Islamist takeover.

At the heart of the current discussions and debates among the power elites in politics and business within and outside Morocco, is the future replacement of the current prime minister, Driss Jettou when this year’s legislative elections are held. The replacement of Jettou will form a government cabinet that will set Morocco’s long-term agenda with issues as important as women’s right, regional politics, relations with the EU and US, etc. As the election date approaches, tension rises among all the political parties competing for power. Citizens are also wondering who deserves their votes in a political system often seen as not so credible.

The debate over the future of Moroccos’ post-2007 elections has spread outside of the country, in particular among the corporate circles in Paris. Indeed 38 of the 40 corporations listed in the CAC-40 Index, the benchmark tracking index for the Paris Bourse, have direct financial interests in the North African nation and potential changes in the political system there are sources of concern. In this context, the role of Islamists has been in the minds of corporate leaders on both sides of the Mediterranean Sea. The issue is so important that Prime Minister Driss Jettou was questioned about this very topic during a meeting with French corporate leaders held in mid December 2006.

In Morocco, the expected victory of the Islamist PJD party worries other political groups, in particular the older nationalist parties. In an editorial published on January 4, 2007, the left-leaning USFP party (Socialist Union of Popular Forces) urged all political parties to make their positions clear and make no secret of their alliances so as to educate voters and give them choices and options. In saying that, the USFP recognizes that voters are already prepared to back the populist PJD party, while lack of transparency among the more secular political organizations has created a great deal of suspicion among voters. The USFP editorial noted “such transparency would differentiate between those who are true defenders of the continuation of political, economic and social reforms, and those who oppose such reforms.”

In previous elections, the political system favored alliances within specific ideologies. Left-leaning parties such as USFP, nationalist Istiqlal party; former communist Party of Progress and Socialism (PPS) and extreme leftist OADP (organization for democratic and popular action) formed an alliance called Koutla to compete against their right-leaning competing counterparts. They also established lists of joint candidates in local and legislative races. But this system came from the days when the power of the Islamist was much more limited. The Koutla, for instance could get a single candidate in a specific race and yet win the elections. With the Islamists expected to upset the 2007 race, past alliances are likely to break so as to field more candidates instead of a unified one. This, according to USFP strategists, would bring move votes to secular parties and could present a barrier to the Islamists.

Still, there is a major wildcard in the Moroccan political system and that’s the King. At the end of the day, Morocco remains a monarchy whose King makes major decision as it was the case in the appointment of Driss Jettou, a man referred to as a “technocrat” rather than a politician with allegiance to a specific ideology. However, in his October 14, 2005 speech, King Mohammed pointed to his leaning toward the selection of a prime minister to replace Jettou based on the outcome of the 2007 elections and not on his choice of a “technocrat.” Whether that will really happen or not will depend on the terms and conditions on how to govern in Morocco. That will be negotiated between the monarchy and the Islamists, if the PJD ends up winning.

The second important and most likely outcome of the 2007 legislative elections is what many in Morocco believe to be a certainty in the non-emergence of a single political party that will dominate to the point that it would form a cabinet single-handedly. While the PJD is likely to be the strongest party, it will not have such a dominant majority that would enable it to form a government on its own. Most political analysts rule out a PJD tsunami. “The likelihood of the PJD to gather 40% of the votes is almost unthinkable,” says a political observer. Some even speculate that the PJD could only hold the second position in the election results ranking, possibly behind the USFP or its rival Istiqlal.

The PJD itself reached the same conclusion. Either to dispel fear or for political calculations, its officials say that “there can be more votes in favor of PJD, but converted into parliament seats, the system does not work with proportionality and does not favor the concentration of seats for the election winner.” The PJD calculates that it could control up to 80 seats in a 325-seat parliament. That would be close to a quarter of the parliament. However, it believes that the parliament’s balance of power will be divided among four or five political parties, not equally but in proportions that are generally close enough to create a block against the most powerful party. While some parties will have more seats, the PJD argues that no one will have so many seats so as to dominate parliament.

If these projections are realized, then the next Moroccan government will be formed with representatives of five major parties, USFP, Istiqlal, PJD, MP party and the RNI. Given its independent nature, the RNI (Rassemblement National des Indépendents) can ally itself with any other party based on its own political interests, although there have been important factions within RNI favoring an alliance with the PJD. This situation has caused tremendous infightings within the RNI to the point that once again the party almost split in two. Differences with RNI caused it to split twice in the past.

The other parties will have positions in the government depending on who actually ends up winning the most seats, since the winner will be in charge of forming the cabinet. Such system was modeled from Turkey, a situation that actually occurred recently with the Hizb Arrafah party of Necmettin Erbakan.

The selection of a Prime Minister, essentially a function controlled by the King, should generally respect the rules of engagement the Monarchy and the political parties agreed upon some years ago. The most important rule is that the Prime Minister should be selected from the winning party. But the Monarchy and the parties could conspire to block the PJD even it wins in a landslide. This is because another important aspect of the selection process is that when the King asks a prime minister to form a cabinet, he or she has up to two months to form such cabinet which must draw its ministers from other parties. If she/he cannot form a cabinet, perhaps due to the conditions or due to a boycott from other parties, the prime minister will have to resign and the King would appoint a new one from the second ranking party.

This year’s elections would see a premier coming out of one of the four parties (MP, PJD, USFP and Istiqlal). From a scenario perspective, if a prime minister is chosen from the MP party (Mouvement Populaire), assuming it wins the elections, it could form a controlling alliance with the independents of the RNI and the leftists of the Koutla, leading to a governing coalition similar to the one currently in place. This combination would probably constitute a smoother transition in that all the main political, social and economic policies and agendas of the current government will be considered with minimum disruption.

But an MP victory would not guarantee and alliance with secular leftist organizations. If the PJD comes in the second position, the MP would have hard time ignoring it and could form a preferred alliance with it, with all the unexpected implications on issues of social policies. But an alliance with the MP and PJD is not just because both parties could end up holding the number one and two ranks. There are historical ties between the two parties that could lead to much more solid relations. The PJD’s origin is the former MPDC party, a political branch that came out of the MP party back in 1967. Strategically the two parties control separate geographical zones and could see complementing each other, with one getting its strength from rural areas, while the other entrenched in large cities. If such alliance is achieved, it means the USFP will have to be excluded. This would transform the USFP into an opposition party, a situation that could possibly turn the Istiqlal into opposition as well. Still, there is a great deal of affinity between the PJD and Istiqlal, given the latter’s conservative stance on social issues. And that creates synergies between the two.

If the PJD wins as many expect, its first and most likely alliance to be formed will be with the Popular Movement party MP, followed by the independent RNI and by the PND and UC parties. If Istiqlal accepts to a join a PJD-led government, the USFP will remain the main opposition party.

What if the USFP comes ahead in the elections? Then the transition from the current government will be rather straightforward and without major complications to the political system. If the PJD scores well, the USFP may have to accept new terms of engagements but could also give non-strategic ministerial portfolio to the Islamist party. Finally the last scenario consists of an Istiqlal victory. This would also mean a normal transition from the current regime, with the USFP walking behind Istiqlal. While the two parties are often allies, they become bitter enemies when the Premiership position is at stake. A too troubling USFP in case of an Istiqlal victory could mean stronger ties between Istiqlal and MP, RNI and even PJD.

Regardless of all these calculations, the next government will have some sort of conservative leaning. The PJD has too many opponents to take full control and even if it ends up winning the most seats in parliament, it only holds one seat in the current 275 second Chamber. By having limited impact on government, it may not be to the interest of PJD to join a coalition government, since joining it risks to lessen its mystical image among the population.

From our perspective, if the PJD wins, Morocco will be better served allowing the Islamists to participate in government. Many Islamist parties in the Arab world have successfully joined legislative and executive branches without disruption a-la Hamas in Palestine. Morocco will certainly face a new political experimentation, but that would have been the choice of the voters.

Arezki Daoud is the Editor of North Africa Journal